Real Estate Markets and Lending : Does Local Growth Fuel Risk? by Zurek, Maximilian
Vol.:(0123456789)
Journal of Financial Services Research
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10693-021-00358-9
1 3
Real Estate Markets and Lending: Does Local Growth Fuel 
Risk?
Maximilian Zurek1 
Received: 1 September 2020 / Revised: 8 June 2021 / Accepted: 10 June 2021 
© The Author(s) 2021
Abstract
Real estate price growth affects credit risk for several reasons: it provides input for eco-
nomic forecasts as it’s closely tied to economic growth; when used as collateral by banks, 
rising real estate prices may decrease both expected and actual losses; and banks may 
become less risk averse in lending practices in the presence of rising property prices. 
Therefore, we analyze these effects on loan portfolios’ estimated and realized risks on a 
local level. Using data of 390 German savings banks, however, we find that real estate 
prices have little or no impact on savings banks’ credit portfolio risk or risk precautions.
Keywords Lending risk · Regional banks · Collateral · Real estate markets
JEL Classification G21 · G32 · G11 · R31
1 Introduction
Real estate markets and investments in real estate have gained increased attention in the after-
math of the financial crisis 2007–2008. Among other reasons, the steady lowering of inter-
est rates has made real estate investments increasingly attractive, as they are not only highly 
leveraged but are also frequently considered safe investments. This has led to increased real 
estate prices in Germany, in a few cities in particular (Siemsen and Vilsmeier 2017). Due to 
the high price and ubiquity of real estate, as well as its economic relevance, property mar-
kets cannot work without proper loan markets. In the worst case, this relationship can lead 
to assigning an increasing number of loans to riskier borrowers who collateralize their debt 
using real estate.
In order to deter borrowers from defaulting, banks demand collateral (Stiglitz and Weiss 
1981), with real estate being the most commonly used collateral device in lending (Niinimäki 
2009). Pledging more collateral may be used as signal of lower borrower risk (Agarwal et al. 
2015), while demanding collateral may be an indicator of lazy banks in the spirit of Manove 
et al. (2001). Collateral thus has a high potential for inducing banks to issue loans to risky 
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borrowers. Banks not only consider collateral-pledging borrowers to be less risky per se, but 
may also perform less monitoring when loans are backed by properties. This tends to act as 
an accelerant on the relationship between property and loan markets: When loans are collat-
eralized with real estate, banks could avoid losses when property prices rise; but if they drop, 
loan losses are more severe as market values of recoveries are below the exposure at default 
(EAD) (Niinimäki 2009). Lower capital reserves held by banks with large real estate portfolios 
(Blasko and Sinkey 2006) could exacerbate the problem. Furthermore, borrowers whose loans 
were overcollateralized at the beginning may have an incentive to default if the price of the 
pledged real estate drops below the outstanding amount of credit (Herring and Wachter 1999).
Banks can also be suborned to use current or past real estate prices as indicators for cur-
rent and future economic development or future real estate prices. Banks expecting high 
growth of real estate prices in the near future might be willing to accept more high-risk 
borrowers whose loans are collateralized by real estate.
Taking both of these arguments into consideration, banks anticipate rising trends of real 
estate values by observing current prices, and therefore may be willing to lend to risky 
borrowers today in the expectation that the same borrowers will be wealthier in the future, 
decreasing their default risk via incentives and their expected loss given default (s. Land-
voigt 2017).
These issues could be even more pronounced in the case of banks that are regionally con-
strained and depend on the economic well-being of their surrounding business area. If banks 
additionally face limitations on their investment policies, they may develop an even stronger 
dependency on real estate price development. This is, indeed, the case for German savings 
banks; because they are heavily engaged in real estate related lending (see Fig. 1), they are 
particularly vulnerable to taking on additional risks when local real estate prices are high. 
As can be seen from Fig. 1, savings banks have been originating one third of housing loans 
for over 40 years, which underpins their high relevance for the German real estate market. 
Including also regionally based Credit cooperatives, about half of German housing loans are 
originated by local banks. The issue therefore is closely linked to locally based banks and their 
connection to local lending markets, which has been a competitive advantage for many years. 
Yet, with the number of branches shrinking and the reduction of personal contact which has 
been fueled by the COVID-19 pandemic, this advantage could parish. Additionally, real estate 
Fig. 1  Shares of all housing loans made to German firms and households across bank types. Savings banks’ 
and credit cooperatives’ business areas are mostly restricted to a few rural and/or urban districts. Data 
source: Deutsche Bundesbank
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prices have soared lately (see Fig. 2), which offers such banks additional opportunities in lend-
ing. Therefore, the combination of loss of informational advantage and seemingly increasing 
profits and lower risk in real estate lending could induce regional banks to switch their lend-
ing strategies towards more transaction-based lending. Consequently, real estate price growth, 
indicating collateral value growth, could affect loan portfolio risk strongly. Thus far, however, 
micro-evidence on real estate’s impact on risk taking in lending has been scarce.
Therefore, we focus on whether local real estate price growth affects savings banks’ loan 
portfolio risk. We suggest that strong local real estate price growth could induce banks to be 
over-optimistic and hence underestimate loan risks. Analyzing this, we use micro level data 
of 390 German savings banks from 2011 to 2018 with Blundell-Bond-estimators being the 
method in use. However, we find no robust evidence that savings banks’ loan portfolio risk is 
driven mainly by real estate price growth or expectations on real estate prices. Results suggest, 
rather, that savings banks’ loan portfolio risk is affected by bank-specific variables and overall 
regional and national economic environment. That is, there is a direct link between loan port-
folio and local economic conditions, and only an indirect channel via housing prices.
The paper proceeds as follows: In section two, we review the literature on the topic and 
present the hypotheses that will be tested. Here, we differentiate between the potential effects 
of real estate price growth on lending and risk-taking behavior of banks. Section three presents 
the data and discusses the characteristics of German savings banks. Section four presents the 
results of the empirical investigation, which comprises an analysis of the effects of real estate 
and loan growth and a second part analyzing the impact of real estate on the risk of banks’ 
loan portfolio with micro data from German savings banks using dynamic panel data meth-
ods. Section five presents conclusions and implications of the study.
2  Literature review
The causal relationships between real estate price growth, lending and risk are complex. 
Our aim is to disentangle these interrelations by identifying four mechanisms that explain 
how the growth in property prices affect lending behavior.
Fig. 2  Annual real estate price growth rates of Germany, the U.S. and the Euro Area as of April 2021. Data 
sources. European Central Bank and U.S. Federal Housing Finance Agency
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First, higher house prices not only require higher loan nominal amounts, but own-
ers’ property values also increase. This enables lenders with real estate collateral to 
obtain higher loan amounts. If banks believe that this growth is sustainable, they will 
increase their lending. If they do not, price growth has no effect on lending volumes, 
which slows down real estate price growth. Research on this topic already has been 
conducted with data on national levels (e.g. Gerlach and Peng 2005), while analyses on 
local levels (e.g. Favara and Imbs, 2015; Defusco 2018) that take spatial heterogenei-
ties within countries into account when it comes to lending, have been scarce. Yet, due 
to the heterogeneity of real estate and differences in banks’ lending behaviors (national 
vs. international vs. local lending), analyses on a large-scaled geographic area could 
lead to misleading results when it comes to understanding lending practices of region-
ally based banks. As business areas of those banks are geographically limited, they 
cannot smooth negative real estate price developments enlarging their business area to 
include regions with positive real estate price growth. To the best of our knowledge, 
this issue has been neglected so far when it comes to analyzing regional banks.
The consequences of lending with overvalued collateral have been discussed by e.g. 
Herring and Wachter (1999) and Siemsen and Vilsmeier (2017). Additional empirical 
evidence has been provided by Koetter and Poghosyan (2010), who analyze the impact 
of deviations of real estate prices from fundamental values on banking stability.
Second, high real estate prices might additionally reduce banks’ monitoring efforts 
and the perceived riskiness of a loan. This can happen either when real estate price 
growth is used as a predictor for future economic performance or when properties 
are used as collateral and expected price growth counteracts expected losses. Bester 
(1985) argues that borrowers with high risk prefer loans with low collateral require-
ments and are willing to accept higher loan rates. Thus, collateral can offer insights 
into borrowers’ analysis of risk. Real estate, which per se reduces risk compared to 
uncollateralized loans, can act as a signal of high-quality borrowers. To the best of our 
knowledge, empirical evidence on the impact of local real estate prices on lending risk 
is scarce, yet theoretical analyses have been published, e.g. by Niinimäki (2009) and 
Bian and Liu (2018).
Third, higher collateral values reduce losses given default (LGD) ex post, which is 
directly linked to ex post risk. Anticipating lower LGDs, lenders may be induced to 
lend to riskier borrowers, which in turn leads to an ex ante constant risk but an ex post 
higher risk, i.e. more realized losses. Prior empirical research mainly has focused on 
other effects on lending, e.g. GDP (Salas and Saurina 2002), unemployment rates (Bal-
asubramanyan et al. 2017) or interest rates (Delis and Kouretas 2011) or issues that are 
directly attributable to a single loan such as collateral (e.g. Berger and Udell 1990).
Fourth, expected losses are not only based on current information, but also on 
expectations regarding real estate price growth. Real estate prices are publicly observ-
able, which is not the case for other local indicators of economic performance such as 
GDP or figures on unemployment. Therefore, banks might base their expectations on 
future economic and real estate price growth on current and past property prices. Sus-
pecting economic growth, banks might be willing to assign risky loans as they expect 
borrowers’ solvency to increase on average. If banks expect continued real estate price 
growth, their expected losses from collateralized losses will decrease. Risky lending, 
therefore, might increase, potentially creating a large gap between ex post and ex ante 
risk measures.
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2.1  Real estate prices and loan volumes
As Gerlach and Peng (2005) point out, the relationship between loans and real estate 
prices is evident in several aspects. With real estate frequently serving as collateral, 
higher housing prices enable borrowers to apply for higher credit amounts. A number 
of studies have found that financially constrained firms increase their borrowing if the 
value of their collateral increases (e.g. Agarwal et  al. 2015; Cvijanovic 2014; Dougal 
et al. 2015). Landvoigt (2017) found that households will increase their leverage if real 
estate prices have increased. Similarly, Defusco (2018) suggested that households will 
try to smooth their consumption if the values of their homes increase, allowing them to 
post higher collateral (Koetter and Poghosyan 2010), and thereby reducing LGDs. Fur-
thermore, increases of real estate prices generate profits for borrowers that improve their 
ability to repay (Zhang et al. 2018).
Additionally, banks’ own real estate assets increase in value and charge-offs of loans 
decrease with increasing property prices (Herring and Wachter 1999). Leaving other 
aspects constant, this increase in a bank’s wealth and the lower expected losses strength-
ens bank capacity to extend of credit. Contrarily, lower credit constraints due to a pos-
sible substitution of monitoring with collateral could fuel demand for mortgage or other 
real estate related loans.
Empirical evidence on the two-way causality between property prices and lending 
volumes is mixed. According to Gerlach and Peng (2005), banks increased their mort-
gage lending in Hong Kong after increased competition due to deregulation of the bank-
ing industry. The authors further found evidence that extended lending did not have an 
impact on property prices, but that the causality ran in the other direction. In contrast, 
Favara and Imbs (2015) found that banking branch deregulation led to a greater volume 
and higher values of loans, which caused real estate prices to rise.
Although competition and low interest rates fuel extension of credit and could cause 
higher real estate prices, real estate price growth per se allows for higher collateral 
amounts. Therefore, we suggest that:
H1: Savings banks’ loan volumes grow with local real estate prices.
Existing studies for the most part have analyzed data on single entities (countries) 
using time-series techniques. Yet, real estate prices are highly heterogeneous between 
regions, hence aggregating loan and real estate data on a national level could miss a 
number of insights. Investigating data from a cross-section of spatial entities could pro-
vide additional understanding of the market power of banks, bank-specific loan growth 
in preceding periods and dependency on local economic development along with house 
price growth. Stable property price growth has special relevance, as non-sustainable 
price increases due to deviations from fundamental values can threaten banks’ solvency 
if their estimation of expected losses is based on current market prices that could be 
corrected in the future when loans are due. As a consequence, otherwise risky loans 
have similar expected payments as safe loans, such that loan loss provisions can hardly 
be correctly determined.
The impact of a strong correction of house prices can be significant for the German 
financial sector. According to Siemsen and Vilsmeier (2017), a drop in housing prices 
can lead to losses of several billion Euros, considering only less significant institutions 
(LSIs). Likewise, Koetter and Poghosyan (2010) found that banks located in areas with 
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high deviations in house prices from their fundamental value have a higher probability 
of being distressed. Yet, a quick adjustment to fundamental values is no simple matter 
in real estate markets given that investors generally do not have the possibility of going 
short. For this reason, real estate markets are considered to be driven by optimists (Her-
ring and Wachter 1999).
To detect some exuberance of real estate prices that might threaten financial stability, 
the deviation from real estates’ fundamental value is often considered an appropriate meas-
ure, as opposed to observed prices (Koetter and Poghosyan 2010). Deviations from fun-
damental values are more easily noted in smaller entities where this information is readily 
observable. Because savings banks are very familiar with local markets, they are in a better 
position to recognize exaggerated prices and thus reject loan applications with offers of 
over-priced collateral. Instead, they might increase efforts to monitor local markets, with 
the latter decreasing overall loan volume due to fixed input factors in the short term, thus:
H2: If local house price increases are not fundamentally driven, savings banks will 
decrease their lending.
2.2  Ex ante risk: economic expectations, collateral, and monitoring
If exaggerated property prices do not result in an extension of credit volumes, loans might 
only take place when there is an increase of real estate prices and a simultaneous reduction 
of risks, i.e. decreasing LGDs (Koetter and Poghosyan 2010). Due to low LGDs, banks’ 
willingness to lend collateralized real estate loans is high (Zhang et  al. 2018). This is a 
consequence of the ability to separate the borrower’s risk from the loan’s risk: a risky bor-
rower could obtain credit if pledging a collateral whose value of recourse exceeds the loan 
amount (Berger and Udell 1990). Yet, because risky borrowers understand their own lend-
ing quality, they will tend to avoid pledging collateral. From a lender’s point of view, this 
collateral is the most valuable.1 In turn, borrowers with low default risk will prefer higher 
collateral over higher interest rates (Besanko and Thakor 1987). Yet, as observably risky 
borrowers face stronger demands to provide collateral for a loan, the higher demand for 
collateral suggests that the probability of default increases with collateralization (Inderst 
and Mueller 2006). Consistent with the work of Besanko and Thakor (1987) and Niinimäki 
(2009), Agarwal et al. (2015) found that, when interpreting upfront payments of mortgage 
loans as collateral, it was younger borrowers in particular who, in spite of having a lower 
score and lower income, made lower upfront payments on average.
As an alternative to demanding collateral, banks could thoroughly screen and monitor 
their borrowers, even though this is more time-consuming and costly. Manove et al. (2001) 
suggested that banks acting in perfect competition preferred to use collateral in lending 
than screening because it was less costly. The cost efficiency of substituting screening with 
collateral is even higher for low quality borrowers (Keys et al. 2010).2 Positive expectations 
with respect to local real estate prices make collateral even cheaper compared to screen-
ing, resulting in a stronger reliance on collateral in areas with real estate prices forecast to 
increase.
1 See also Berger and Udell (1995) who find that collateralized loans are riskier than unsecured, with the 
overall risk of the former being reduced by their collateral.
2 Further analysis of substitution of monitoring by collateral can be found in Niinimäki (2009).
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Screening a borrower using all available information when lending leads to an expected 
loss, which is the foundation of ex ante risk. Furthermore, write-offs or non-performing 
loans (NPLs) capture the realized risk of a loan portfolio, i.e. ex post risk (Berger and Udell 
1990). We argue that real estate prices have an impact on ex ante risk via expectations on a 
future willingness to pay and values of collateral. If banks observe current real estate price 
growth, they are able to predict rising prices in the future. Hott (2011), for example, argued 
that banks might prefer to stick to momentum forecasts than fundamental real estate values, 
as they are well diversified, having only minimal risk exposure toward fundamental factors. 
He also found that banks’ myopic strategies did not take real estate cycles into account. 
Table 1  Variable definitions and data sources
Variable name Variable Description Data Source







ĉondoP   Growth of condo prices (Euro/sqm) within 
banks’ business area
Empirica AG
ĜCL   Growth of Gross Costumer Loans Bank Focus
GDP GDP per Employee in thsd. Euros German Federal Statistical Office
ĥouseP   Growth of house prices (Euro/sqm) within 
banks’ business area
Empirica AG
HP Deviation Deviations from fundamental house prices 
(based on own calculation)
own calculations
impaired Impaired loans / Gross costumer loans Bank Focus
Lerner Lerner Index for market power (based on own 
calculation)
own calculations
LLR Loan loss reserves / Gross customer loans & 
advances
Bank Focus
LLRIMP Loan loss reserves / Impaired loans Bank Focus
loans/TA Loans/Total Assets Bank Focus
LTA Natural logarithm of Total Assets Bank Focus
monitoring Monitoring Effort proxied by 
Number of employees
Gross loans to costumers
Bank Focus
/ own calculations
NCO Net charge offs / Average gross customer 
loans & advances
Bank Focus




̂population   Growth of population (in %) within banks’ 
business area
German Federal Statistical Office/own 
calculations
PopDens Population Density as inhabitants per square 
km within banks’ business area
German Federal Statistical Office/own 
calculations
profits Profit (loss) before tax Bank Focus









Empirica AG /own calculations






unemp Local unemployment rates within banks’ busi-
ness area
German Federal Employment Agency
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Therefore, banks could consider loans less risky in the future as their collaterals increase, 
accepting higher risks at the present. This effect is even more pronounced on a local level, 
as real estate prices vary across regions.
Additionally, as a result of an increase of property prices, the wealth of risky borrowers 
increases and former collateral barriers are no longer considered a deterrent. We expect 
these effects to be stronger for locally-based savings banks. Thus, the ex ante risk of loans 
will, on average, decrease.
H3: Real estate price growth reduces ex ante risk.
Expectations regarding the future economic condition of a household represent an 
important aspect of the estimation of a loan’s risk. As real estate price increases are caused 
by various economic factors (Gerlach and Peng 2005), property prices can serve as indica-
tors for overall local economic growth. Compared to other economic variables (e.g. GDP 
or unemployment rates), real estate prices are observable and indicate the wealth of a 
region. Therefore, higher household incomes and resulting higher capacity to repay loans 
could result in growth in local housing prices. According to Hott (2011), banks’ optimism 
concerning the wealth of a household has a significant impact on real estate prices and can 
lead to circular effects when it comes to lending. If projecting recent price growth of real 
estate markets to future prices is not sustainable (Herring and Wachter 1999), worrisome 
overvaluation would be a consequence and either ex ante risk and/or realized risk will be 
higher.
2.3  Ex post risk: default and realization of real estate collateral
As Hott (2011) found that lending tightens in response to defaults rather than in anticipa-
tion of them, ex ante risk measures could be erroneous. Alterations of economic conditions 
or ratings during the lifetime of a loan are, instead, reflected by ex post risk measures. 
These include real estate price growth, which could have a significant contribution to the 
performance of loans and especially the ex post risk of a loan portfolio. This could happen 
either by a collateralization effect, i.e. by a reduction of losses given defaults (similar to 
Koetter and Poghosyan 2010) or by an incentive effect, i.e. by increasing borrowers’ incen-
tives not to default as losses would increase with real estate prices.
Borrowers’ incentives not to default are higher when the value of their collateralized 
property increases or price increases are expected. Additionally, the possibility of secur-
ing collateral reduces agency costs and information asymmetries, as well as alleviates the 
funding of borrowers (Cvijanovic 2014). Here, again, we stress the prevalence of provision 
of collateral by highly creditworthy lenders; As collateral commonly has a higher value for 
borrowers than for banks and as borrowers may be limited in their use of the pledged asset, 
pledging collateral can be regarded as costly for the borrower (Agarwal et al. 2015; Coco 
2000). Different costs may also arise with the use of collateral, depending on whether out-
side or inside collateral is in use (for differentiation, s. Niinimäki 2009). Pledging outside 
collateral is costly for the borrower according to Bester (1985), whereas for Besanko and 
Thakor (1987), the lender incurs the costs of collateral. Inside collateral is explicitly with-
out costs for the borrower (Niinimäki 2009).
Turning to the effect of collateralization, banks incur lower ex post risk if prices of real 
estate collateral increase, given that larger fractions of defaulted loans can be covered. This 
reduction of realized losses is observable in banks’ charge-offs of loans. Yet, collateral 
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does not decrease a loan’s risk per se. Berger and Udell (1990) found that loans with fixed 
interest rates and collateral had below average performance, which the authors took as evi-
dence that securing collateral was insufficient to eliminate a loan’s risk.
Furthermore, the on average higher risk premia and higher charge-offs for banks hold-
ing more real estate collateralized loans, suggest that loan risk cannot be fully covered by 
collateral and that these loans bear some degree of high risk. Similarly, Blasko and Sinkey 
(2006) found that banks that are highly engaged in real estate lending over several years 
have lower net loan losses. This is partly confirmed by Zhang et  al. (2018), who found 
a negative relationship between local growth of real estate investments and NPLs, i.e. ex 
post risk is decreased, possibly due to the higher collateralization of loans. The authors 
also found that a reduction in the level of real estate market activity renders banks that are 
strongly engaged in real estate lending unstable. Salas and Saurina (2002) argued that the 
impact of GDP growth on Spanish savings banks’ ratio of problem loans is weaker than 
that of commercial banks, which have more customers dependent on business cycles. Thus, 
savings banks’ lending success may be attributed to local economic factors that are more 
independent of national business cycles. As real estate prices are strongly linked with the 
local economy and economic cycles, our results should be similar to those of Salas and 
Saurina (2002).
We expect past real estate prices or expectations of real estate price growth to decrease 
ex post risk via the collateralization and the incentive channel:
H4: Real estate prices decrease ex post risk.
2.4  Default forecasts and over‑optimistic expectations of real estate prices
Not only are real estate investments commonly regarded as having little risk, but local 
lending is also perceived as relatively low risk due to spatial proximity, or ‘home bias’ in 
lending. Both factors contribute to the potential underestimation of the risk of lending with 
real estate collateral in a local setting. Therefore, expectations of risk and future property 
prices as determinants of LGDs could be mediating factors between real estate prices and 
lending behavior.
Several studies deal with potential links between current real estate prices and banks’ 
expectations of future risks. Hott (2011) argues that positive income shocks may have an 
impact on price expectations, leading to current price increases. As banks base their expec-
tations on current prices, expected prices then increase and continue the feedback process. 
According to Zhang et al. (2018), the threat to financial systems posed by falling real estate 
investments has the potential to be severe if it becomes a correction to the housing market. 
Recent experiences in house price development influence not only lenders’ expectations of 
future prices, but also those of borrowers, who are therefore able to make higher upfront 
payments for mortgage loans (Agarwal et al. 2015) or apply for loans, even when unable 
to signal low risk and receive a favorable contract. Thus, there might not only be a higher 
offering of credit, but also demand from risky borrowers.
Indeed, in an analysis of data on U.S. homeowners, Defusco (2018) found that loans 
obtained by extracting equity, i.e. using the increase in property value to obtain additional 
loans, are riskier than comparable loans, with the risk being measured using foreclosures.
In the case of expected increasing real estate prices, banks attempting to maintain a con-
stant aggregate net present value (NPV) for loans are willing to grant loans to borrowers 
with higher probabilities of default. Banks will continue lending to risky borrowers as long 
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as the annual increase in the overall default probability is less than the expected annual 
growth of collateral value. This tendency may be exacerbated when relying excessively 
on collateral as opposed to screening; the deteriorating survival probabilities of loans can-
not be observed directly, while properties can be appraised on an ongoing basis. Given 
the potential for unanticipated losses (see section 2.2), engaging in riskier lending behav-
ior when relying on estimates of future collateral values may have considerable impact on 
banks.
Therefore, on average, a lower ex post risk than suggested by ex ante risk measures 
occurs if banks have not anticipated the actual positive real estate price growth. When real 
estate price growth is weaker than expected, the ex post risk will be higher than suggested 
by the ex ante risk. In both scenarios, the gap between the two measures widens with recent 
real estate price growth.
We consider this gap between loan risk provisions and realized loan risks as a poten-
tial scenario for German savings banks. Legal limitations on their business activities and 
their embeddedness in local economies may lead to overconfidence in forecasting local real 
estate prices. As political impacts concerning property price and economic growth may 
reinforce local forecasting (Illueca et al. 2014), we formulate our final hypothesis:
H5: Higher recent real estate price growth weakens banks’ risk forecasting ability.
2.5  German savings banks
Savings banks are a major constituent of the German banking system and are highly rel-
evant for business financing and retail customers. Their loan volumes to non-monetary 
financial institutions (MFIs) grew by almost 24% from the beginning of 2011 to the end 
of 2017, leading to a loan volume toward non-MFIs of 951 billion Euros (Data: Deutsche 
Bundesbank). Loans toward non-MFIs originated by savings banks constituted about 24% 
of all loans originated in Germany toward non-MFIs by the end of 2018, starting from 
19% during the onset of the financial crisis of 2007/2008 (Data: Deutsche Bundesbank). 
This underlines the high relevance of savings banks within the German financial system. 
Aside from being highly relevant in Germany, savings banks are a commonly used repre-
sentative for locally based banks: The focus of their business is deposit-lending; investment 
banking activities play a negligible role for most savings banks. This strong similarity of 
basic investment policies is an additional advantage for the analysis, as there should not be 
systematic variations of risk-taking (Conrad et al. 2014). Furthermore, their dense network 
of branches allows to draw consequences from the results for regional financial institu-
tions where – due to the connection towards the region - funding and lending practices are 
highly correlated.
Koetter and Poghosyan (2010) found that savings banks have an even lower probabil-
ity of becoming distressed than small-sized and regionally-based cooperative banks, which 
may be a partial reflection of their aversion to business risk.
German savings banks are also restricted geographically in terms of their area of oper-
ation and they are present throughout the whole country. These business areas typically 
coincide with urban or rural districts or cities (similar to Metropolitan Statistical Areas). 
Because these banks are particularly sensitive to local economic variables (e.g. Reichling 
and Schulze 2018),  they are convenient for analyses that may include business areas and 
local factors (Conrad 2008).
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Salas and Saurina (2002) found that bank level characteristics, such as market power 
and local indebtedness of borrowers, have a high explanatory power for the growth of prob-
lem loans in the case of Spanish savings banks. Thus, notable differences between results 
of analyses on an aggregate and individual level could be based on the sensitivity of locally 
operating banks toward their particular economic environment.
Given savings banks’ mandate to guarantee a supply of funding within their business 
areas, they are likely to have a higher exposure to riskier borrowers than more transac-
tion-based-lenders.3 As local lenders, they are likely to demand higher collateral and lower 
interest rates for loans than transaction-based lenders (Inderst and Mueller 2006).4 Savings 
banks are also likely to be more dependent on mortgages due to their limited investment 
opportunities, rendering them especially vulnerable to changes in local real estate markets.
3  Data
Using micro-level data of regions with varying real estate growth permits us to analyze 
whether the relationship between property investment and NPLs is sensitive to property 
cycles (Zhang et al. 2018). While there are advantages to using land prices to gauge real 
estate price development (e.g. Cvijanovic 2014), real estate data is available only on a 
local level through recorded transactions. The data, including number of transactions, size, 
prices and location of sold properties, may also vary across time and between jurisdictions. 
County-level real estate data were obtained from empirica ag’s quarterly database, using 
offered buy and rent prices of house and condo prices with hedonical adjustments. Hedonic 
house price indices use data from actual transactions and offers and therefore include a 
variety of information sources that cover a large portion of local real estate markets. Their 
correction for individual property characteristics overcomes bias in the data as a result of 
low transaction volumes and due to different qualities of real estate transactions. To have 
greater comparability and ability to calculate price-rent ratios, we use prices and rents for 
houses and condominiums of all ages.
We collected information on the entities that are included in savings banks’ official 
jurisdictions from their annual accounting reports, the addresses of their branches, their 
statutes or other reports published on their homepages. We cross-referenced this informa-
tion with county data on real estate price growth and brought to a single value by calculat-
ing averages.
Unemployment rates within business areas are publicly available from the German Fed-
eral Employment Agency.
The core of the empirical investigation uses micro-level data on German savings banks, 
obtained by Orbis Bank Focus. Bank-level data include data from balance sheets and profit 
and loss statements, including information on NPLs, loan loss reserves and loan net charge-
offs on the portfolio level, which can represent ex ante or ex post risk measures. The unbal-
anced panel dataset comprises 390 savings banks with observations spanning from 2011 to 
2018. Performance differences of loans might occur even when controlling for hard facts 
due to variations in the use of soft information (e.g. Keys et al. 2010). Because this type of 
3 Salas and Saurina (2002) mention the possibility that savings banks could have higher ex post risks due to 
financing riskier projects in favor of local economy.
4 The finding of Christians and Gärtner   (2014) that German savings banks in rural areas demand higher 
collateral from their borrowers support the theoretical predictions of Inderst and Mueller (2006).
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information is frequently used by small local banks when granting loans, it may also affect 
savings banks, which exhibit some similarities to privately managed banks.
4  Empirical investigation
In her empirical investigation, Cvijanovic (2014) assumed that a firm’s real estate assets 
were located in the same MSA as the firm’s headquarters. Similarly, we assumed that mort-
gage lending and collateralization only took place in the savings banks’ jurisdictions and 
in the areas of their supporting agencies. We took into account real estate prices from the 
counties where the bank has branches or in cities where the banks’ supporting agencies 
operated. As the exact geographic origins of loans and deposits were not documented, we 
refrained from spatial weighting methods.
We used dynamic panel data estimation as risk-taking might have some persistence due 
to long-term relationships with borrowers, competition, and other external circumstances. 
Delis and Kouretas (2011), using a Blundell-Bond estimator, found that risk-taking is 
highly persistent for the first lag. Furthermore, savings banks often assign long-term loans, 
for which the risk transfers from the preceding period. Additionally, there could be auto-
correlation in NPL ratios as found by Zhang et al. (2018).
As dynamic panel data estimation implies endogeneity via construction, ordinary least 
square procedures would produce biased results. Endogeneity can also potentially be found 
in several explanatory variables, such as efficiency (Conrad et al. 2014), real estate prices, 
and others. The use of GMM estimators is a common method to overcome the problem of 
first differencing resulting in a short panel bias (Behr 2003; Flannery and Hankins 2013). 
To model persistence of ex ante and ex post loan risks and the impact of real estate prices, 
Arellano-Bond-Estimators (Salas and Saurina 2002) and Blundell-Bond System-GMM 
are commonly used (Delis and Kouretas 2011; Zhang et  al. 2018). The use of the latter 
is justified by persistence of the explained variable. In such cases, the first differences as 
employed by the Arellano-Bond estimator are rather weak instruments (Baltagi 2008, p. 
160f). As first estimations yielded some high persistence of our measures of ex ante and ex 
post risk, we employed the System GMM estimator in what follows. We employed Wind-
meijer’s finite-sample correction (Windmeijer 2005; also used e.g. by Olszak et al. 2018) to 
guarantee the robustness of the estimation results.
4.1  Estimation and variables
In this section we briefly present the variables used in the following estimations.
Following Salas and Saurina (2002) and Olszak et  al. (2018), we used the following 
estimations to grasp the impact of real estate price growth on loan risk:

















βj+1 Real Estate Price Growthit−j + ηi + ϵit
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Where we varied the lags of the explanatory variables, considering different points of 
time of ex ante and ex post risk. For the sake of simplicity, bank and business area spe-
cific variables are both denoted by i, with real estate price growth as business area variable 
being measured in different ways. Variable definitions and data sources are displayed in 
Table 1.
We used several variables as bank specific controls as suggested by Delis and Kouretas 
(2011). Banks’ equity ratios capture the deliberations between an increase in risk neces-
sary for capital requirements. Furthermore, equity ratio has an impact on banks’ risk tak-
ing itself. To take this into account, we included banks’ capital ratios (TCAR it), similar 
to Olszak et  al. (2018). As Reichling and Schulze (2018) found German savings banks 
located in wealthier regions to be more efficient, we included the cost income ratio (CIRit) 
to take this into account. We used net interest margins (NIMit) to account for banks’ ability 
to generate earnings by assigning new loans and their general profitability (s. Blasko and 
Sinkey 2006).
As Hott (2011) pointed out, past profits affect banks’ optimism regarding future earn-
ings. Hence, lagged profits may impact not only lending volumes, but also the riskiness of 
loans in several ways. On the one hand, low profits might lead banks to engage in more 
and/or riskier lending. Contrarily, it could also lead them to reduce risky loans to prevent 
further losses. Here, profitsit is defined as 
Profits and losses before taxesit
Total assetsit
.5
We included branch growth as an explanatory variable for loan volume growth 
( ̂branchesit ) (Illueca et al. 2014). As business areas of savings banks are bindingly defined 
and rather small (commonly equal to one or two counties), we did not include branch 
growth in the additional risk estimations as geographical expansions into other market 
areas are not conducted.
Furthermore, banks with a high portion of real estate lending have higher loan to asset 
ratios, which may also affect their provisions for loan losses (Blasko and Sinkey 2006). 
Thus, this ratio was also included (Sinkey and Greenawalt 1991) as loans/TAit, calculated 
as Gross costumer loansit
Total assetsit
.
Because banks’ higher risk taking or higher losses may result from less monitoring, 
monitoring intensity, proxied by Number of employeesit
Gross loans to costumersit
 was included (Kick and Prieto 2015). 
A further issue worth noting is a potential deterioration of monitoring activity (Manove 
et al. 2001). Thus, monitoring could be endogenous as well, with real estate price growth 
having a strong impact on it.6
Another common explanation of bank risk taking is competition between financial 
intermediaries (e.g. winner’s curse) (Forssbaeck and Shehzad 2015). For locally-based sav-
ings banks, measures of competition take into account several dimensions of local lend-
ing and borrowing, including local wealth, the share of county deposits, the number of 
branches within an area, interest income per branch, etc. Yet, most of this information was 
either not available at all or had low explanatory power due to a variety of factors, such 
as different hierarchies of branches of commercial banks. Furthermore, classical meas-
ures of market concentration, such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index (HHI) on deposits 
on a county level, are often not bank-specific variables, but rather locally dependent and 
5 As current earnings can be related to the risk level of bank lending, lagged values are used (Delis and 
Kouretas 2011).
6 Note that a mere substitution of monitoring by increasing real estate prices should not alter risk taking, 
thus a separation between effects is to be expected.
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their effects can be proxied by county-dummies. Thus, as a common index on a bank-level, 
we employed a Lerner-Index  (Lernerit) based on the procedure described in Berger et al. 
(2009) (see Appendix).
Similarly, the growth rate of gross costumer loan volume ( ̂GCLit ) could be an indicator 
of whether higher loan losses were due to an unequal growth of loan quality and quantity 
regarding ex post risk. Higher ex ante risk with higher loan growth, however, might indi-
cate a market expansion or confidence in future returns, possibly induced by growing real 
estate prices.
As savings banks should have similar standards and techniques in lending, loan loss 
reserves relative to gross costumer loans for each bank and year (LLRit) were used as the 
measure of ex-ante risk to capture how observed credit risk was priced before actual losses 
occurred. Ex post risk was gauged using the banks’ impaired loans, divided by gross cus-
tomer loans (impairedit). This wider definition of ex post risk captures most of the credit 
that belongs to problem loans in the spirit of Salas and Saurina (2002).
We used three different measures for real estate price growth: Two of them were 
growth of house prices within counties, matched with savings banks’ business areas 
( ̂housePit ) as well as growth of condo prices ( ̂condoPit ). Sinkey and Greenawalt (1991) 
found regional economic factors, proxied by dummy variables, to explain only a very 
small fraction of loan loss variation of banks. The authors concluded that loan loss 
rates were instead driven by managerial abilities. This stresses the relevance of manag-
ers’ perception of real estate markets and their estimates.7 To take this into account, we 
used price-to-rent-ratios on the county level matched with business areas (PRRit). Note 
that price-to-rent-ratios not only capture potential deviance from fundamental values, 
but also future expectations considering real estate prices. Price-to-rent-ratios therefore 
serve as an observation of local market expectations whereas past price developments are 
input data for individual expectations. Thus, PRRit captured the effects of the incentive 
channel (i.e. a borrower’s incentive to repay her loan in order not to lose her collateral 
with expected price growth).
Summary statistics for the dependent and real estate variables can be found in Table 2. 
The data were not trimmed or corrected for outliers, and the means are in line with those in 
other studies. For example Balasubramanyan et al. (2017), using US-based data from 1997 
to 2011, found that all loan loss reserves represented 1% of total assets on average, while in 
our study it was 0.844%.
In order to determine the extent to which real estate prices reflected local economic 
development, we employed growth of unemployment rate in the banks’ business areas 
( ûnempit ). It should be emphasized that the dynamic panel analysis focused on local real 
estate price development, thus overall national real estate price growth/decline was only 
considered within year dummies, which also controlled for the effects of low interest 
rates and a higher stock market turnover. These parameters have a high stake at deter-
mining banks’ risk-appetite. Delis and Kouretas (2011) analyzed risk-taking behavior of 
banks in 16 Euro-zone countries from 2001 to 2008 and found that banks in a setting of 
low interest rates shifted their business to more risky investments, as well for ex ante 
risk (captured by risk assets
total assets
 ) as ex post risk ( NPL
gross loans
 ). Furthermore, banks redistributed 
their assets to more risky and non-standard banking assets in the presence of low inter-
est rates.
7 Contrarily, Cyree and Morris (2018) find that banks in high income and low population counties mostly 
outperform those located in low income counties. Thus, local economic factors seem to matter or at least 
attract more/less talented managers.
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4.2  Loan growth
The first estimation is additional micro-evidence to previous studies based on aggregate 
levels in order to detect regionally-based causal relationships between loan volume and 
housing price growth. With regard to the following estimations, higher loan volumes or 
extension of credit in response to increases in real estate prices could forego higher loan 
risks if good borrowers already have obtained credit without extension of loans.
We included current (yearly) real estate price growth in order to identify correlations 
(Gerlach and Peng 2005) that may be caused by the stated current observability of real 
estate price growth, as opposed to e.g. GDP growth, and the time interval in years that 
allows for an impact of current values.8 As an additional explanatory variable, we used ex 
post risk of two previous periods to check whether past negative experiences concerning 
credits had a negative effect on current loan growth. The results are displayed in Table 3.
The results indicate that the major drivers of loan growth were losses and impaired 
loans of the previous period (i.e. recently made experiences in lending), monitoring efforts, 
the relevance of lending for the bank’s business, and branch growth. None of the real estate 
price growth variables, nor unemployment growth as a proxy for regional economic devel-
opment, were statistically significant in any of the estimations.
The results disprove the first hypothesis on a local short term (yearly) level. We suspect 
that savings banks’ reactions to real estate prices were not notable on an overall loan vol-
ume level, which could be due to a rather inelastic loan supply. A positive correlation on an 
aggregate level as graphically suggested by Fig. 3 therefore cannot be confirmed.
The coefficients on price-to-rent-ratio were not significant and changed signs, indicat-
ing that market expectations on real estate price growth did not have an impact on loan vol-
umes. We also checked whether the reverse direction of causality would apply to the data 
and estimated the equation using loan growth as explanatory and house price growth and 
price-to-rent-ratio as dependent variables (including their lags as right hand side variables). 
This neither produced significant coefficients nor superior overall results. As loan volume is 
only available for savings banks, not for the whole county, results of this estimation could be 
biased.
For testing hypothesis two, the change of loan growth and deviance of prices from the 
fundamental value, we conducted regressions with the same control variables using price-
to-rent-ratio growth, squared price-to-rent-ratios, a dummy, if the current and lagged price-
to-rent-ratio exceeds the yearly averaged ratio by more than 10 %, and interaction terms 
with this lagged dummy variable and house price growth (Table 4). None of these were 
significant, although this result does not necessarily indicate that savings banks did not 
react to the exuberance of real estate markets; higher ratios might be justified in certain 
locations and thus not represent an exaggeration of prices.
4.3  Ex ante risk
Ex ante risk cannot be determined unambiguously, as higher loan loss provisions can 
either indicate higher expected loan losses or lower underwriting quality (Dou et al. 2018). 
Olszak et al. (2018) argue that large banks are more procyclical and more prone to moral 
hazard due to too-big-to-fail thinking. Hence, we additionally included bank size as an 
explanatory variable, measured as natural log of total assets (LTAit). Yet, as savings banks 
8 Inclusion of additional lags did not produce additional significant coefficients.
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are supported publicly and are not excessively large, those problems are not expected to be 
especially relevant for the estimation.
As can be seen from Table 5, savings banks’ loan loss reserves decreased with cur-
rent house price growth and price-to-rent ratios, i.e. future market expectations. As 
stated initially, house prices — in contrast to GDP — can be observed continuously. 
Thus, current house price growth includes all observations during the year, technically 
enabling them to have a simultaneous impact on end-of-the-year loan loss rates. The 
effects were not highly significant, which is partly due to the Windmeijer correction. 
Further lagged house prices did not have a significant impact, which is partially due 
to the use of lagged loan loss rates, which reflect the explanatory power of the lagged 
house prices.
Although the results of estimation (5) indicate that banks reduced their loan loss provision-
ing (i.e. ex ante risk) in the face of increasing property prices, the effect was not robust. As can 
be seen from estimation (8), the coefficient of unemployment growth was stronger in terms of 
statistical significance. Local house price growth may reflect some degree of overall local eco-
nomic growth effects, which is supported by the insignificance of condo price growth.
The negative coefficient of the price-to-rent-ratio, indicating lower ex ante risk, was 
small in economic significance, and the changing sign for the coefficient of the preceding 
year indicated weak robustness. We will therefore perform a closer analysis of the effects 
of deviations of real estate prices from the fundamental value in the latter sections.
Additional non-dynamic panel system GMM estimations using L̂LRit as the dependent 
variable did not produce valuable insights or different results concerning the real estate 
variables.
4.4  Ex post risk




 . Berger and Udell (1990) used loan risk premia as ex 
ante risk measures while ex post risk was gauged by others through loan charge-offs, over-
due 30 days or 30–89 days, and renegotiated. Turning to hypothesis four, we instead follow 
Delis and Kouretas (2011) who used the ratio of risk assets9 to total assets and the ratio 
Table 2  Summary statistics. Bank specific data comprise 390 German savings banks, house and condo 
price growth and price-to-rent-ratios are gauged on the level of 401 urban and rural districts. Real estate 
prices are hedonic price indices. Circumflex denotes growth variables
Variable Mean SD Min Max Obs
̂Gross Loans   0.0383 0.0758 −0.2446 1.9493 1729
Loan Loss Reserves
Gross Loans
0.0136 0.0093 0.0001 0.0897 1997
Impaired Loans
Gross Loans
0.0263 0.0186 0.0001 0.171 1937
̂House Prices   0.0463 0.052 −0.1483 0.3145 2723
̂CondoPrices   0.0617 0.0766 −0.379 0.657 2730
Price − to − rent − ratio 20.0995 4.1881 6.4313 51.6336 3120
9 Under risk assets the authors subsume all assets with volatile values and lead to varying profits (Delis and 
Kouretas 2011).
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of NPLs to gross loans as proxies to evaluate banks’ risk taking. As the authors argued, 
these measures are better suited to measure banks’ risk taking than a z-score (Mohsni and 
Otchere 2014), which evaluates the probability of bank insolvency rather than risk engage-
ment. Thus, we use impaired loansit
gross costumer loansit
 as the variable to describe problem loans. Following 
Table 3  Results of Blundell-Bond-Estimation of growth of gross costumer loans. The estimation uses dif-
ferent lag lengths for level and difference instruments and employs Windmeijer’s robust standard errors. 
Growth variables are denoted by circumflex
Significance levels are indicated by * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: ĜCLit   ĜCLit   ĜCLit   ĜCLit  
ĜCLit−1   0.152 0.109 0.153 0.169
impairedit − 1 -0.007** -0.006* -0.005 -0.006*
impairedit − 2 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001
loans/TAit − 1 -0.474*** -0.459*** -0.475*** -0.459***
loans/TAit − 2 0.047 0.029 0.085 0.074
TCAR it -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.006*
TCAR it − 1 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.004
Lernerit -0.224 -0.118 -0.131 -0.152
monitoringit -0.314** -0.337** -0.289** -0.289**
CIRit -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
NIMit 0.017 0.002 -0.015 0.007
profitsit − 1 5.657* 5.911* 6.534* 5.153**
profitsit − 2 2.437 2.702 2.584 2.136
̂branchesit   -0.047** -0.042** -0.047** -0.045








unempit − 1 -0.004
N 546 546 546 546
Number of instruments 72 72 72 78
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
First order Arellano Bond Test -3.03*** -2.82*** -2.98*** -3.26***
Second order Arellano Bond Test -0.1 -0.49 -0.53 -0.14
Hansen Statistic 50.55 43.53 44.82 55.11
p value Hansen Statistic (0.298) (0.576) (0.522) (0.395)
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the arguments of Salas and Saurina (2002), the resulting variable impairedit was trans-









As Balasubramanyan et al. (2017) pointed out, estimating NPLs using loan loss provi-
sions (LLPs) can be biased, as LLPs may be based on expectations for NPLs, and thus 
LLPs are not independent from future loan performance. Endogeneity, therefore, has 
another stake in estimating the equation.10 The results of the estimation can be found in 
Table 6.
Table 4  Results of Blundell-Bond-Estimation of ex ante risk. Ex ante risk is measured as loan loss reservesit
gross costumer loansit
 . 
The estimation uses different lag lengths for level and difference instruments and employs Windmeijer’s 
robust standard errors. Growth variables are denoted by circumflex
Significance levels are indicated by * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable LLRit LLRit LLRit LLRit
LLRit − 1 0.809*** 0.814*** 0.796*** 0.817 ***
ĜCLit   -1.032* -0.817 -0.994* -1.143*
ĜCLit−1   -0.08 -0.059 -0.073 -0.068
LTAit 0.051* 0.052* 0.062** 0.045
TCAR it − 1 -0.027 -0.015 -0.012 -0.025
TCAR it − 2 0.038* 0.025 0.023 0.033*
Lernerit 0.513 0.282 0.838 0.763
monitoringit -0.313 -0.174 -0.310 -0.422
CIRit -0.003 -0.003 0.000 -0.002
NIMit 0.041 0.043 -0.050 0.049
profitsit − 1 -16.470 -14.640 -12.860 -20.377






PRRit − 1 0.018
unemp -0.094
unempit − 1 0.091
N 1,175 1,176 1,176 1,175
Number of instruments 56 56 56 61
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
First order Arellano Bond Test -4.48*** -4.17*** -4.28*** -4.55***
Second order Arellano Bond Test 1.06 0.78 0.79 1.05
Hansen Statistic 28.97 36.59 31.06 30.63
p value Hansen Statistics (0.668) (0.275) (0.564) (0.829)
10 Balasubramanyan et al. (2017) use a 2SLS procedure to overcome this problem by first estimating LLP 
using current NPLs and using the estimates when quantifying NPL.
Journal of Financial Services Research 
1 3
In addition to efficiency, the most obvious finding was the persistence of loan portfolio 
riskiness, with the lagged dependent variable close to 100%. This variable explained a high 
share of the variation of the following impaired ratio, rendering at least some of the other 
lagged variables without individual explanatory power, but rather bundling their effects.
The second finding is that there was a robust positive impact of loan growth on loan 
risk. Riskier borrowers could be the consequence of the bank already having saturated 
high quality borrower markets and being forced to lend to bad borrowers due to com-
petitive pressure or bank strategy (closely related to winner’s curse effect). This result is 
especially meaningful, as we did not find robust effects of loan growth on loan loss provi-
sions, hence the realized losses associated with previous loan volume growth seem to be 
unanticipated. This impression was reinforced by the even higher coefficient of the lagged 
Table 5  Results of Blundell-Bond-Estimation of ex post risk. Ex post risk is measured by  impaired loansit
gross costumer loansit
 . 
The estimation uses different lag lengths for level and difference instruments and employs Windmeijer’s 
robust standard errors. Growth variables are denoted by circumflex
Significance levels are indicated by * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
(9) (10) (11) (12)
Dependent variable impairedit impairedit impairedit impairedit
impairedit − 1 0.989*** 0.979*** 0.983*** 0.959***
ĜCLit−1   0.197* 0.193* 0.220** 0.201*
ĜCLit−2   0.301** 0.284** 0.338** 0.276**
TCAR it − 2 -0.006 -0.003 -0.003 -0.011
TCAR it − 3 0.009 0.015* 0.011 0.011
Lernerit − 1 -1.542** -1.138 -0.984 -1.566*
Lernerit − 2 -0.026 -0.040 -0.022 0.013
monitoringit − 1 -0.487 -0.752 -0.776 -0.598
monitoringit − 2 0.421 0.368 0.534 0.372
CIRit -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003
CIRit − 1 -0.008** -0.006 -0.006 -0.009**
̂housePit−1   -0.189 -0.180
̂housePit−2   0.045 0.041
PRRit − 1 -0.011
PRRit − 2 -0.002
̂condoPit−1   -0.026
̂condoPit−2   -0.118
unempit − 1 -0.030*
unempit − 2 0.045
N 793 793 793 793
Number of instruments 54 54 54 61
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
First order Arellano Bond Test -2.38** -2.40** -2.38** -2.37**
Second order Arellano Bond Test 0.76 0.85 1.08 0.62
Hansen Statistic 37.79 37.17 39.78 38.69
p value Hansen Statistic (0.222) (0.243) (0.162) (0.574)
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growth variable, suggesting weaker predictability of loan losses due to a longer time hori-
zon between loan approval and default.
We expected banking competition to have a positive impact on NPLs, as in Zhang et al. 
(2018). This is also in line with Herring and Wachter (1999) who argued that disaster 
Table 6  Results of Blundell-Bond-Estimation of ex post appropriateness of loan loss reserves. Ex post 
risk appropriateness of loan loss reserves is measured by  loan loss reservesit
impaired loansit
 . The estimation uses different lag 
lengths for level and difference instruments and employs Windmeijer’s robust standard errors. Growth vari-
ables are denoted by circumflex
Significance levels are indicated by * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
(13) (14) (15) (16)
Dependent variable LLRIMPit LLRIMPit LLRIMPit LLRIMPit
LLRIMPit − 1 0.690*** 0.688*** 0.681*** 0. 688***
ĜCLit   -176.000 -158.800 -138.200 -54.982
ĜCLit−1   -12.000 -10.260 -8.340 -3.415
ĜCLit−2   -7.520 -6.735 -5.622 -1.904
TCAR it − 1 -0.020 -0.153 0.421 1.428
TCAR it − 2 -0.352 -0.444 -0.706 -1.280
TCAR it − 3 -0.336 -0.385 -0.396 -0.334
profitsit − 2 -460.800 -136.200 -368.500 -421.710
profitsit − 3 870.200 1038.900 780.000 -136.053
Lernerit 384.000** 375.000** 304.400* 229.610
Lernerit − 1 -94.050 -93.620 -61.590 -67.616
Lernerit − 2 -14.040 -14.770 -11.520 -6.227
monitoringit -415.600* -404.200* -432.700 -453.596*
monitoringit − 1 333.600* 337.500* 358.800 360.116*
monitoringit − 2 44.320 33.310 34.050 31.250
CIRit 2.246** 2.219** 1.802 1.395





PRRit − 1 -0.042
PRRit − 2 -0.047
unempit -2.917
unempit − 1 1.793
unempit − 2 -0.122
N 774 774 774 774
Number of instruments 33 37 37 41
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
First order Arellano Bond Test -2.05** -2.23** -1.89* -2.06**
Second order Arellano Bond Test 0.53 0.52 0.27 0.24
Hansen Statistic 2.31 2.67 2.15 4.74
p value Hansen Statistic (0.941) (0.953) (0.976) (0.980)
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(a) Loan Growth 
(b) Loan loss reservations / gross costumer loans 
(c) Impaired loans / gross costumer loans 
Fig. 3  Loan Growth, Loan loss reservations, and impaired loans of German savings banks. Graphic repre-
sentation of variables of the Micro-Dataset in use together with house and condo price growth; Values rep-
resent sample averages. a Loan Growth. b Loan loss reservations / gross costumer loans. c Impaired loans / 
gross costumer loans
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myopia could be increased through competition, as non-myopic banks are unable to with-
stand the pressure that arises if risk premia are too small. This decreases returns and banks 
increase their leverage. In fact, there is some evidence from our estimations that savings 
banks with higher market power have lower ex post risk. This result contrasts with the find-
ings of Salas and Saurina (2002), who found that market power increased problem loans 
for Spanish savings banks.
Finally, current and past house price growth, used as a proxy for expectations on future 
house price growth, did not appear to influence the ex post risk of savings banks’ loans. 
Unreported regressions, using net charge offsit
gross costumer loansit
 as the dependent variable, as in Sinkey and 
Greenawalt (1991), confirmed that real estate price growth did not have a significant effect 
on savings banks’ loan portfolios’ ex post risk. This is line with the results of Koetter and 
Poghosyan (2010), who found that savings banks were on average less likely to default as 
a consequence of deviations of housing prices from fundamental values.
4.5  Monitoring, ex post loan loss reserves and deviations from fundamental values
A number of factors can explain the results with regard to ex post risks. As we found 
that loan growth did not affect risk provisions but realized losses, special attention 
should be paid to hypothesis 5. The term ex post loan loss reserves used in what fol-
lows compares loan loss reserves to realized credit risk, i.e. high/low values indicate 
bad loan loss reserves policy, which could be due to either speculations on rising val-
ues of collateral or to overall economic conditions. We tested how real estate price 
growth affects savings banks’ estimation of risks and their optimism using LLRIMPit, 
defined as loan loss reservesit
impaired loansit
.
As loan loss reserves and impaired loans are affected by different lags of the explanatory 
variables, we included up to three periods of each variable. Again, we estimated a dynamic 
panel model, as the two components of the dependent variable were endogenous — loan 
loss reserves and impaired loans were highly persistent. In order to examine the effects of 
monitoring without including real estate prices, we estimated parsimoniously instrumented 
models without considering condo price growth as before, but rather estimating a baseline 
model without real estate variables.
The results in Table 7 suggest that monitoring had an effect on the ratio with varying 
signs concerning the lags. Current efficiency and market power seemed to have positive 
impacts on the reserves/losses ratio, which would contradict a too-big-to-fail moral hazard 
problem.
Most importantly, the regression shows that local real estate prices did not induce 
banks to be over-optimistic. Hypothesis 5 thus is rejected. With regard to the previ-
ous estimations, this undermines the finding that savings banks’ loan portfolio risk was 
not determined directly by real estate prices, but rather by economic factors, which in 
term helped determine real estate growth. In unreported estimations, we found that the 
effects of population growth in certain places were even stronger than unemployment 
rate growth.
As savings banks are backed by public entities and are exposed to less pressure to 
achieve high gains in the short run, they might unintentionally be less prone to engage in 
riskier lending. Furthermore, savings banks have strong links with local real estate mar-
kets, providing them with local knowledge and enabling them to observe the risks that stem 
from real estate related lending.
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Therefore, besides using price-to-rent-ratios as signal of house price deviations, we 
calculate fundamental house prices using Pooled-Mean-Group (PMG) estimation, as 
described by Pesaran et al. (1999) and used by e.g. Kholodilin et al. (2007) and Koetter 
Table 7  Results of Blundell-Bond-Estimation of loan growth with price-to-rent-ratio related explanatory 
variables. PRR Dummy_it is a dummy variable, indicating whether the price rent ratio in the business area 
was at least 10 % higher index than the average over all business areas in the respective year. The estimation 
uses different lag lengths for level and difference instruments and employs Windmeijer’s robust standard 
errors. Growth variables are denoted by circumflex
Significance levels are indicated by * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
(17) (18) (19) (20)
Dependent variable ĜCLit   ĜCLit   ĜCLit   ĜCLit  
ĜCLit−1   0.163 0.116 0.205 0.199
impairedit − 1 -0.007** -0.005 -0.008*** -0.006
impairedit − 2 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
loans/TAit − 1 -0.444*** -0.469*** -0.487*** -0.480***
loans/TAit − 2 0.059 0.034 0.102 0.119
TCAR it -0.003 -0.003 -0.005** -0.003
TCAR it − 1 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.002
Lernerit -0.141 -0.170 -0.250 -0.192
monitoringit -0.289** -0.336* -0.275** -0.260*
CIRit -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
NIMit -0.007 0.010 0.019 -0.009
profitsit − 1 5.870** 6.394* 5.579* 6.522**
profitsit − 2 2.464 2.769 1.961 2.203
̂branchesit   -0.046** -0.045** -0.047** -0.048**
̂branchesit−1
   -0.008 -0.011 -0.004 -0.009
PRR  Dummyit -0.005













N 546 546 546 546
Number of instruments 72 72 78 72
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
First order Arellano Bond Test -2.96*** -2.84*** -3.18*** -3.11***
Second order Arellano Bond Test -0.69 -0.65 -0.49 -0.36
Hansen Statistic 48.38 45.03 53.04 45
p value Hansen Statistic (0.498) (0.513) (0.434) (0.514)
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and Poghosyan (2010) and checked whether savings banks increased their ex post loan 
loss reserves in response to potential bursting of a housing price bubble. Our model 
uses population growth, income gauged by gdp per employee and population density 
as explanatory variables.11 The resulting error correction representation of the model 
therefore is
Due to availability, the data for the estimation span from 2005 to 2017. The results 
are displayed in Table  8. Deviations from fundamental house prices are calculated as 
HousePi,t−1 − 𝜃0 − 𝜃1GDPit − 𝜃2 �populationit − 𝜃3PopDensit . We additionally plotted the 
results using German fringe counties to highlight the differences between calculated funda-
mental real estate prices and price-to-rent-ratios (s. Fig. 4).
We estimated the impact of this alternative specification of real estate price develop-
ments on loan portfolio risk of savings banks using previously used model specifications. 
The results are displayed in Table 9. As can be seen, as previous measures, deviations from 
fundamental house prices do not seem to explain savings banks’ loan portfolio risks. Yet, 
from the results we learn that local variables have a significant impact on house prices. 
Therefore, impacts of house price developments on loan portfolio risk could be driven by 
local economy variables in the first place.
4.6  Panel vector autoregression
As additional check of the robustness of the results, we investigate whether the local 
economy has a direct impact on loan risk or the former affect house prices which then 
pass these effects on to loan portfolios. Loan risk hence would be impacted by local 
economy rather than price increases, thus dismissing explanations via collateral. We 
estimated a panel vector autoregressive model where we used per capita GDP growth 
within the business area, unemployment rates, population density as indicator of local 
urbanization, house price growth, deviations from fundamental house prices and loan 
growth as endogenous variables besides the mentioned loan portfolio risk variables and, 
used as additional ex post risk indicator, net charge-offs to average gross loans (NCOit). 
The results can be found in Table 10. As can be seen, regional variables only have lit-
tle explanatory power, except for local GDP growth and house price variables, which 
is surprising, as we would have expected house price growth to have less impact than 
e.g. unemployment rates. Yet, as GDP has proved to be an important determinant of real 
estate prices (see Table 8), the effect of real estate price growth could be highly impacted 
by GDP growth.
To analyze this relationship closer, we additionally calculated orthogonalized 
impulse response functions (OIRFs), adopting the procedure described by Sigmund 
and Ferstl (2021). Therefore, we ordered the local economic variables in the beginning 
of our estimation as we supposed that effects of local economy are more likely to be 
passed on to house prices which then affect loan portfolio risk. The results for GDP 
ΔHousePit = i
(
HousePi,t−1 − 0 − 1GDPit − 2 ̂populationit − 3PopDensit
)
+ iΔHousePi,t−1 + 1iΔGDPit + 2iΔ ̂populationit + 3iΔPopDensit + it
11 Due to the rather short longitude of the data, we used one lag only (s. Koetter and Poghosyan 2010). 
Specifications using more lags did not result in superior models.
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growth, which proved to have the strongest impact on loan portfolio risk measures, and 
house price growth and deviations from fundamental values are shown in Fig. 5.
While impulses of house price growth tend to reduce over the course of time, the effects 
of GDP growth are much more persistent, although on an economically low level. Further-
more, it becomes evident that house price and GDP growth do not move parallel, but in 
parts even in the opposite direction. The rather pronounced effect of house price growth 
in the short run is additional evidence that real estate prices could be used as first indica-
tor when making loan decisions, rather than only reflecting local economic figures, which 
are the basis of loan decisions. Yet, while the effects of real estate growth decline quickly, 
GDP as underlying factor has a steadier effect on loan portfolio risk measures.
Fig. 4  Quintiles of price-to-rent-ratios and deviations from fundamental house prices in % of current house 
prices in 2017. Data grouped by German fringe counties. Own representation based on data from Empirica 
AG, own calculations and shape data provided by the German Federal Agency for Cartography
Table 8  Results of estimation 
of PMG model of fundamental 
house prices (Estimation 
25). ̂population is calculated 
as percentual growth rate, 
Population Density as inhabitants 
per square km (in thsd.) and 
GDP per Employee is measured 
in thsd. Euros. Estimation data 
range from 2005 to 2017
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Table 9  Results of Blundell-Bond-Estimation of Loan growth and loan risk including calculated deviations 
from fundamental house prices. Instruments and lag lengths are the same as in previous estimations. The 
estimation uses different lag lengths for level and difference instruments and employs Windmeijer’s robust 
standard errors. Growth variables are denoted by circumflex
Significance levels are indicated by * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Dependent variable ĜCLit   LLRit impairedit LLRIMPit
(26) (27) (28) (29)
ĜCLit   -0.602 -169.296
ĜCLit−1   0.071 -0.060 0.192* -13.153
ĜCLit−2   0.334** -8.036
LLRit − 1 0.805***
impairedit − 1 -0.005 0.994***
impairedit − 2 -0.000
LLRIMPit − 1 0.703***
LTAit 0.032
loans/TAit − 1 -0.396***
loans/TAit − 2 -0.021
TCAR it -0.003
TCAR it − 1 0.002 -0.016 0.157
TCAR it − 2 0.027 -0.003 -0.385
TCAR it − 3 0.009 -0.065
Lernerit -0.063 -0.564 403.807**
Lernerit − 1 -1.430* -105.893
Lernerit − 2 0.090 -17.414
monitoringit -0.325** -0.128 -400.992*
monitoringit − 1 -0.591 311.661*
monitoringit − 2 0.450 44.729
CIRit 0.000 -0.007 -0.000 2.374*
CIRit − 1 -0.008** -0.549
NIMit 0.010 0.152
profitsit − 1 5.925* -15.785
profitsit − 2 1.026 -3.298 -358.970
profitsit − 3 438.488
̂branchesit   -0.055***
̂branchesit−1   -0.010
HP  Deviationit 0.322 1.818 -165.606
HP  Deviationit − 1 -0.314 -1.673 -0.041 165.133
HP  Deviationit − 2 0.109 11.730
N 541 1,159 768 761
Number of instruments 71 55 53 36
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
First order Arellano Bond Test -2.89*** -4.17*** -2.00** -2.04**
Second order Arellano Bond Test -0.3 0.63 0.99 1.19
Hansen Statistic 48.65 37.54 32.86 2.36
p value (0.487) (0.399) (0.613) (0.999)
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5  Conclusions
This paper studies the effects of real estate prices on German savings banks’ risk taking 
in lending. It contributes to the existing literature in several ways: It analyzes the impact 
of real estate price growth on loan risk, uses a micro-level perspective to do so, and uses 
a forward-looking metric to reflect market expectations. In contrast to Koetter and Pogho-
syan (2010), which is to the best of our knowledge the most similar study that has been 
published, we do not focus on real estate price deviations from fundamental values on 
banks’ default probability, but on the effects of real estate price growth on loan portfolio 
quality. The consequences of a positive impact of real estate price growth on banks’ loan 
portfolio risk would be severe: On the one hand, local lending would be  systematically 
distorted: While banks lend to risky borrowers in economic prosperous areas with grow-
ing real estate prices, banks located in economically lower performing areas with stable 
or decreasing property prices would act more conservative. Therefore, adverse selection 
problems in lending obtain a spatial dimension, e.g. when deposits (credits) are shifted to 
non-risky (risky) banks and thus capital allocation would be impeded.
On the other hand, lending to risky borrowers inflates real estate prices, which in 
turn leads to additional and even riskier lending. Extensive real estate lending, having a 
Fig. 5  Orthogonalized Impulse Response Functions of selected variables. Besides loan and house price 
growth we used loan loss reserves as ex ante risk measure and impaired loans to gross costumer loans and 
net charge-offs to average gross loans as ex post variables
Journal of Financial Services Research 
1 3
higher loan to asset ratio than other lending (s. Bian and Liu 2018; Blasko and Sinkey 
2006) would aggravate risks. Bursting bubbles cannot only result in borrowers’ defaults, 
but contagion effects of bank defaults could aggravate arising problems quickly. As real 
estate bubbles frequently are distributed unevenly across spatial entities, micro-evidence 
on loan portfolio risk and real estate price growth is highly relevant. This not only holds 
true for German housing and lending markets, but for many countries inheriting banks 
with politically and geographically limited business.
Overall, there was no robust evidence that real estate price growth has an impact on 
savings banks’ ex ante or ex post loan portfolio risk. There was only some slight evi-
dence that loan loss reserves were affected by past and current price developments of 
regional real estate markets, but this effect was dominated by overall economic devel-
opment. This result is in line with the findings of Koetter and Poghosyan (2010) who 
find savings banks to be on average less prone to default whereas house price devia-
tions increase banks’ probability of default. Additionally, there was a high persistence 
of loan factors, which has already been noted as justification for the usage of system 
GMM. This underscores the relevance of loan maturities when determining NPLs and 
the significance of collateral in lending. Including those data might offer additional 
insights into the riskiness of loans collateralized by real estate. Furthermore, as lend-
ing practices of savings banks are strongly depending on local economic conditions, 
which determine real estate prices, there could be some indirect link between loan port-
folio risk and real estate markets. Analyzing the impacts of various economic indicators 
we do not find robust evidence that either local economic conditions have significant 
impacts on loan portfolio risks.
This result is subject to some limitations with regard to data availability. The observed 
time span may have been too short to represent a full real estate cycle. The study’s results 
do not exclude loan losses or the absence of caution by savings banks, as long-term real 
estate developments were not investigated. Additionally, there has been a steady real 
increase of real estate prices for virtually all German regions since the onset of the Euro-
pean sovereign debt crisis. Expected loss and loss given default estimates thus still should 
be monitored thoroughly by banking supervisors.
Another issue is that national economic factors, such as overall economic development 
or interest rates, have greater explanatory power than regional factors. This may be due to 
their higher relevance for deposit-lending in the case of interest rates and the consecutive 
attractiveness of other over-regional business fields like equity investments. As the time 
dummies were significant in many of the equations, this is a plausible explanation.
The empirical results reject a strong reliance of savings banks on house price growth 
rates when it comes to lending. This result could not only be the consequence of lending 
techniques, but also due to legal issues: Banks are legally obliged to consider haircuts in 
their estimations of LGD (European Parliament, 2013, Capital Requirements Regulations 
(CRR) I, Art. 181 (1) e))12 because borrower risk does not depend on the development of 
the value of the collateralized real estate (European Parliament, 2013, CRR I, Art. 125 (2) 
b) and Art. 126 (2) b).
Additionally, due to their geographically-restricted business areas, savings banks are 
closely connected with their borrowers, allowing them the use of soft information (Berger 
and Black 2011). While this does not fully replace collateral, local information may help 
12 s. Besanko and Thakor (1987)
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savings banks to correctly forecast borrowers’ future economic conditions and to soften 
their lending techniques by taking into account factors other than collateral for their loan 
decisions.
Future developments in business administration and management might thus be 
crucial for local banks and their environment: Shifting their techniques from relation-
ship to transaction-based lending could not only decrease costumer relationships and 
induce banks to engage in higher risks, but also reduce the availability of funding in 
regions with weaker economic performance. The economic consequences of the ongo-
ing pandemic-induced de-personalization of interaction and business could thus have 
long lasting effects on underperforming areas and widen interregional economic gaps.
Appendix: Lerner index
We briefly present choice and calculation of the measure of competition using the Lerner 
Index. For locally based savings banks, measures for competition that take into account 
several dimensions of local lending and borrowing include local wealth, share of county 
deposits, number of branches within an area, interest income per branch, etc. Yet, most of 
this data was either not available at all or had low explanatory power due to a variety of 
factors, such as different hierarchies of branches of rival commercial banks. Furthermore, 
classical measures of market concentration, such as Herfindahl-Indices on deposits on a 
county level, are very sensitive to the non-homogeneity of banks (Forssbaeck and Shehzad 
2015). Additionally, variables are commonly not bank-specific, but rather locally depend-
ent, and their effects can be gauged by county-dummies.
Thus, as a common index on a bank-level, we employ a Lerner-Index based on the pro-
cedure described in Berger et al. (2009) and Feldkircher and Sigmund (2017). The Lerner 
index is defined as
Where marginal costs are derived from
With costs stemming from the translog function:
Total assets are described by TAit, input costs by Fk : F1 is labor costs, described by 
staff expenses
TA
 , F2 are costs of funds ( 
interest expense
total deposits
 ) and F3 are costs of fixed capital 
( operating expenses
TA
 ). The dependent variable (total costs) is calculated as the sum of total oper-
ating expenses and total interest expenses.
The results of the estimation of the equation above can be found in Table 11. 
Lernerit =
Price of Total Assetsit −Marginal Cost of Total Assetsit
Price of Total Assetsit
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As in Berger et al. (2009), we used year fixed effects and robust standard errors (clusters 
on a bank-level basis). At first glance, there were two issues that would reject the use of 
year dummies. First, F-Tests suggested that the year dummies were jointly insignificant for 
some specifications. Second, they captured overall economic conditions, which are suppos-
edly of less relevance for regionally non-systemic banks. They were maintained in all esti-
mations, however, as the effects of (national) interest levels and other economic conditions 
would otherwise be falsely assigned to local house price growth. Many of the coefficients’ 
values and significances were similar to the results of Feldkircher and Sigmund (2017).13
13 The high R2 coefficients are similar in magnitude to those found by Feldkircher and Sigmund (2017) and 
Shaffer and Spierdijk (2019).
Table 11  Results of estimation 
of translog cost function in order 
to calculate the Lerner Index 
for each bank. Estimations were 
conducted using year fixed 
effects and clustered standard 
errors. Dependent variable is 
the natural logarithm of total 
operative expenses and interest 
expenses in Euro
Significance levels are indicated by * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
ln(Total Assets) 1.261***
(17.120)
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The obtained coefficients were then used together with the input data described above to 
calculate marginal costs, which are then used to calculate each bank’ s Lerner-Index.
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